Welcome to the *EUI Times*, the magazine from the European University Institute.

In this special print issue for Autumn 2015, we are happy to reach out to our alumni and friends, and invite them to reconnect to the Institute on both an intellectual and personal level. This issue touches on some of the most challenging issues facing not only Europe, but the entire world, reflecting the topical nature of much for the work being done at the EUI these days.

In our Features section, we focus on the events which happened closest to ‘home’, interviewing Professors Olivier Roy, Martin Scheinin and Anna Triandafyllidou to put the Paris attacks in context and discuss what they mean for France and Europe.

Additionally Professor Yousef Cassis and PhD researcher James Dennison offer their analysis on the implications of Brexit, or British exit. Likewise, mindful that tackling climate change remains one of the most urgent and universal challenges of all, Jean Monnet Fellow Philip Schleifer and Professor Jean-Michel Glachant weigh in on the upcoming COP21 conference in December and what it means for climate governance.

In historical perspective, elsewhere we interview Professor Stephane Van Damme and PhD researcher Nick Mithen about cities. Perennially a contested space, the city remains central to policy debates and cultural discourse in the 21st century.

We also continue our coverage of the migration crisis, turning to Professors Marise Cremona, Brigid Laffan, Federico Romero, Olivier Roy, and Anna Triandafyllidou for their very brief opinions regarding the question ‘will the migration crisis break Europe?’

Instead Professor Martin Scheinin and Research Fellow Mathias Vermeulen reflect on their experience working with the Tunisian Human Rights League, a member of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2015.

In our Profiles section we explore the research interests of SPS Professor Klarita Gërxhani, Fernand Braudel Fellow M’Hamed Oualdi and Law PhD researcher Theodosia Stavroulaki.

As ever, we sincerely hope that you enjoy this issue of *EUI Times*. In the spirit of debate and exchange, we welcome your thoughts and comments on the issue and the themes it addresses.

Stephan Albrechtskirchinger
Director, Communications Service
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Luigi Achilli, Jelena Džankic
The attacks that engulfed Paris last week have profoundly shaken a continent and left a mood of grim resignation in the French capital. Scores were killed in a chilling series of attacks on bars, restaurants, a concert hall and a stadium, in one of the worst atrocities on French soil since the 1961 Algerian Massacre. At the same time, last week dozens more were killed in bomb blasts in Beirut. The Islamic State, (ISIS) has claimed responsibility for both attacks.

In response to the Paris attacks and amid a wave of public grief and outrage, President Francois Hollande swiftly declared that ‘we are going to lead a war which will be pitiless,’ promptly launching air strikes on the ISIS stronghold of Raqqa in Syria. Hollande also called for a state of emergency and for new authorities to divest French citizenship from people allegedly involved in terrorism.

Coming months after the Charlie Hebdo shootings in January this year, the attacks have reawakened fraught debates about Islam in France and in the world and raised questions about the effectiveness of existing anti-terrorism safeguards. There are additional fears the attacks could lead to the further marginalisation of France’s Muslim population, while many commentators have pointed out the unfair, indeed racist, selectiveness in the world’s outpouring of grief for Paris but relative neglect of Beirut.

But EUI Professor Olivier Roy is adamant that the attacks are not indicative of an increasingly powerful or militant Islamism permeating European societies. In an interview with EUI Times, he affirms that, “No, on the contrary, this attack [was committed by] the same kind of people who have been involved in terrorist actions in the past twenty years: disenfranchised youth made up of second generation Muslims and converts. That hasn’t changed, but the way they connect themselves with international organisations apparently has changed.”

Likewise Professor Anna Triandafyllidou of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies does not believe that the attacks represent a systemic failure of integration in western European societies nor that wider generalisations can be deduced about the prevalence of Islamic extremism in society.

Vis-à-vis social integration, France has long faced criticism over its Parisian banlieues, the impoverished suburbs in the periphique which are home to immigrant majority-Muslim communities, as well as high levels of crime and unemployment. “This is not a question of integration.” Triandafyllidou tells EUI Times firmly. “It’s not a systemic failure. It’s a very radical expression of a malaise that exists, but the malaise is not such that it is a massive social phenomenon. It is very radical but it is very small.”

“The attacks have reawakened fraught debates about Islam in France and in the world and raised questions about the effectiveness of existing anti-terrorism safeguards”
Roy adds, “There will be a backlash against the manifestation of religion, the mosque, the veil. But you have Muslims at all levels of society. We tend to think they live only in certain neighbourhoods, but the bulk of the Muslim population in France doesn’t live there.”

He also argues that the narrative of ‘Islam versus the west’ needs to be urgently abandoned. “The narrative is used by ISIS, it is used by the provenance of the ‘clash of civilisations’, it’s used by the extreme right. It is an easy narrative because it seems to fit. But in fact I think people themselves know that society is more complex and more diverse.”

For Law Professor Martin Scheinin, the French state’s response to the attacks, which have included the suspension of free assembly, raises fears that civil liberties and the rights of minorities are now vulnerable. He tells EUI Times, “it is clear that in many European countries there is a real risk of further marginalisation and alienation of Muslim populations. If that happens, it only makes the situation worse, as social exclusion is one of the conditions conducive for the recruitment to terrorism.”

He goes on to warn that “terrorist profiling should be explicitly rejected by prominent political leaders. They should also engage in building good community relations with Muslim communities, together with the police that should actively and visibly recruit members of minorities into their ranks.”

Scheinin likewise warns against a knee-jerk response to the attacks in favour of more surveillance, cautioning, “calls for increased surveillance are regularly heard after every terrorist attack, even when too much surveillance on too many people has failed and has become a part of the problem. In most terrorist attacks, including the recent ones in Paris, at least one of the perpetrators was known in advance to the authorities. Casting the net wider and wider through mass surveillance of ordinary people means collecting more and more ‘hay’, instead of going after the known ‘needles’.”

As French police continue to launch dramatic pan-European raids to track down the individuals responsible, and Hollande continues to wage an air strike offensive against ISIS in Syria, many have expressed despair at the escalating violence and the seemingly bleak prospects for ethno-religious harmony. The task falls to western policy makers to reconcile navigating the path towards peace and social inclusivity, with the age-old desire to demonstrate decisive action.

Olivier Roy is Joint Chair in Mediterranean Studies at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)/Department of Political and Social Sciences, and Director of the recently concluded ERC Project Religiowest. Martin Scheinin is Professor of International Law and Human Rights at the EUI. He directed the recently concluded Framework Programme 7 project SURVEILLE, Surveillance: Ethical Issues, Legal Limitations, and Efficiency. In 2005-2011 he served as United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism. Anna Triandafyllidou is Robert Schuman Chair Professor at the RSCAS and Director of the Global Governance Programme’s Research Strand on Cultural Pluralism.
Much has changed since 1946 when Winston Churchill boomed in his Zurich speech that “We must recreate the European family in a regional structure called, as it may be, the United States of Europe”. Out of the ravages of war and genocide, the European Union was stubbornly born.

But in 2017 Britain will vote in a referendum on whether to leave this European Union. Derided as the awkward partner since it joined the EU in 1973, Britain’s relationship with the EU has long been lukewarm. Like a standoffish party guest munching on the hors d’oeuvres but eschewing small talk, Britain it is assumed, has never fully reconciled itself to true union with its Continental neighbours.

But as the EU stumbles through a succession of crises, from refugees, to Ukraine to Greece, could Britain’s potential departure (known as Brexit) be the final death knell for Europe? Or will Britain ‘#bremain’? And precisely what historical forces lie behind these Eurosceptic impulses?

James Dennison, a PhD researcher in the EUI’s Department of Social and Political Sciences, believes that Britain’s involvement in the EU project has always been conditional and pragmatic in character. While the upcoming referendum may be a response to specific EU policies of recent years, it is also in part the culmination of long-term disengagement with processes of European integration. “Ever since Britain joined the European Union support has been far lower than the equivalent in other EU Member States”, he tells EUI Times.

“The height of British pro-Europeanism was when it was seen that Europe equals business. However in the last ten years, it has been a great source of instability.”

“British membership of the European Union is based on cost-benefit rationale. For the first forty years, Europe was a source of stability; it did a great job of that. It institutionalized markets, it institutionalized democracy. The height of British pro-Europeanism was when it was seen that Europe equals business. However in the last ten years, it has been a great source of instability.”

“Economic anxiety and lingering political reticence cloud discussion of Britain’s involvement in the wider EUI project.”

But untangling the competing thought-strands in British Euroscepticism is difficult, not least because hostility to the EU is present on both sides of the political spectrum. Though generally associated with a conservative positioning, the rise of the so-called Lexit position (left-exit) reflects the growth of Euroscepticism, on the left in recent years. This camp points to what they see as the economic strangulation of Greece, the rise of neoliberal EU initiatives such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and distant Brussels elites as evidence of the EU’s inherently anti-democratic tendencies.

For the right-wing, the EU has always been synonymous with a loss of British sovereignty and a gate-way to mass migration through the freedom of movement initiative. Like the Lexiters, they also see Brussels as an anti-democratic policymaking arena.
Nevertheless, Dennison affirms that “left versus right remains a fairly good predictor for attitudes to Europe. The Greek crisis has changed things a lot, but ultimately the left will fall behind the idea [of remaining in the EU]. They are not receptive to anti-immigration feelings. There’s also an instinctive internationalism in the left. They see the EU as the lesser of two evils; it is still less ‘neoliberal’ than the UK. There are some social protections which come directly from Europe for instance.” These social protections include those on human rights and the EU Working Time Directive which limits working hours for example.

But there is the additional dimension of age colouring the sketches of the debate. British Eurosceptics tend to be old and its EU supporters young. Dennison tells EUI Times, “The biggest cleavage in explaining attitudes to Europe remains age. Young people are relatively speaking, extremely pro-European. Big majorities of the under-30s support European membership. So it’s not written in stone that Britain will remain Eurosceptic forever.”

Dennison sees this as the result of decades of steady cultural acclimatisation, with young people in Britain growing up immersed in the cultural trappings of European integration. “They’ve had a different life to their parents and grandparents which will leave a residual pro-Europeanism even if as they age, they become more conservative. They’ve grown up with Erasmus; they’ve grown up with EasyJet. They’ve never known Britain outside Europe; they were born in a European Britain. For this reason, I suspect Euroscepticism will decline in the UK.”

While there are fears that Brexit could signal the end of the European Union as we know it, many contend that rather, it is more likely that Britain itself will be the bigger loser. While the full implications of course remain unknown, Youssef Cassis, Joint Chair at RSCAS and Professor in the EUI’s Department of History and Civilization, believes that Brexit could be hazardous to the British economy and especially its prized financial sector. Cassis argues that Brexit could spark the decline of London as an international financial centre. Financial services currently contribute around 10% of UK GDP.

In the Yves Mény Annual Lecture on Europe’s Financial Capitals since the Early Twentieth Century given at the EUI, Cassis maintained that ‘London’s position is ultimately fragile. The policy of opening up to the world bore fruit but left London very dependent on foreign financial institutions. Paris and
Frankfurt have not given up all ambition to supplant London should the opportunity arise.”

He tells *EUI Times*, “There is a risk that France and Germany, which have centres of some significance in Paris and Frankfurt, want to take advantage of Brexit to reinforce their status as international centres. There has always been a rivalry.”

Cassis believes that disconnected from the channels of European financial markets and potentially shut out from the European single goods market, Brexit could render London redundant as a global financial hub. Were Britain to leave, “as a pure offshore financial centre, detached from Europe, London would be bound to lose some of its importance.” Deutsche Bank has indeed reportedly declared that it would move its operations out of Britain in the event of Brexit.

But on the flip-side, “A Yes [to EU membership] would reinforce London’s position as Europe’s financial centre with a gradual and complex move towards the City being properly backed by the European economy,” Cassis adds.

However, attitudes towards Europe in the UK vary wildly according to its constituent parts. A ’No to EU’ result could provoke a fresh constitutional crisis over the Scottish question. The Scottish National Party (SNP), which seeks an independent Scotland is the third-largest political party by membership in the UK and the largest in Scotland. Crucially, it is also staunchly pro-Europe. If Britain votes to leave the EU, but the majority of Scottish voters vote to remain, it could give the SNP a claim to demand another referendum over Scottish independence. The SNP could therefore use a Brexit vote as a manoeuvring tool.

Of course myriad uncertainties surround Brexit. Economic anxiety and lingering political reticence cloud discussion of Britain’s involvement in the wider EUI project. The relationships, economics, financial and political, that Britain would adopt with the EU in the event of a Brexit remain wholly ambiguous.

Likewise, referenda are notoriously volatile political instruments, with their results often boiling down to variables such as the popularity of the government at the given time, as well as the wording of the question posed. One thing remains certain however: a clean-cut divorce between Britain and the EU looks impossible.

Youssef Cassis is Professor of Economic History and Joint Chair in the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and the Department of History and Civilization at the EUI.

James Dennison is a third year researcher in the Department of Political and Social Sciences at the EUI. He is a research associate on the Chatham House project ‘Britain in a Changing Europe’.
Dubbed ‘#dieselgate’, revelations that German car manufacturer Volkswagen has been systematically cheating US emissions tests have shaken the world of climate governance. The scandal has undermined faith in the idea that private companies can be relied upon to self-regulate when it comes to carbon emissions. Jean-Michel Glachant, Director at the Florence School of Regulation (FSR) tells EUI Times resignedly, “The Volkswagen ‘dieselgate’ puts into strong doubt what we citizens can expect from industry self-regulation: do companies really self-regulate in the interests of consumer safety? It also deeply questions our approach to the EU: why do we deny EU institutions the right and the duty to be as harsh as US federal agencies when a European company voluntarily harms EU public interest?”

Yet even so, Philip Schleifer, a Max Weber Fellow and former Jean Monnet Fellow at the EUI, is adamant that state and private regulation can be complementary. Formerly affiliated with the LSE’s Grantham Research Institute headed by Lord Stern, Schleifer believes that progress on reducing emissions reductions can only arise through amicable rather than adversarial relations with big business.

“If [businesses] adopt the right policies they can really make a difference. They can promote environmental change in a good way. To get them to do this they need the know-how which can be partly supplied by NGOs but also to some extent they need to be pressured into it because business is ultimately about business.”
On the question of dieselgate, Schleifer adds, “Scandals across industries show that companies cannot be trusted to self-regulate effectively. Therefore, there needs to be regulatory oversight by states (or civil society). If this is done well, it can work. But this is not easy to design in practice, especially in the context of transnational production.”

In the past three decades, as protecting the environment has mushroomed in importance for policymakers, one of the most striking developments has been the détente between business and state in formulating policy responses. Indeed the Volkswagen scandal has exposed the problem of state and business getting too cozy. “In Germany, there is clearly a problem with automotive industry and regulators being too close (many top politicians taking up positions in the industry and its associations, the state of Lower Saxony holding a significant share of Volkswagen’s shares).”

Policies to curb emissions have not been imposed upon businesses, but rather, generated in partnership with them, alongside NGOs and other civil society groups. Yet this represents a major discursive shift at a worldwide level. Historicizing the prevailing tendencies in the global policymaking sphere, Schleifer points out that “In the 1970s when the first UN conference took place, limits to growth was very strongly on the policy agenda. In the early days of environmental policy, it was more in this critical, neo-Malthusian approach.”

In contrast, today’s political climate has seen a departure from the anti-systemic, disruptive forms of environmental protest which defined the 1970s and 80s, towards a greater tendency for a collaborative approach. Schleifer, a self-proclaimed pragmatist, sees no need to remove global capitalism in its entirety. “One position would say capitalism and environmentalism are reconcilable in principle. Others would argue it needs a greater regime shift. I would hope they are reconcilable because I don’t see a radical shift coming. When we look at civil society today, we see a division of labour, with different types of civil society groups taking a different approach to working with business. For example, you have WWF, the largest environmental NGO which has taken a more collaborative approach, partnering with businesses such as Unilever. But we also see NGOs which have taken a more adversarial approach such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth. Both are important. It’s good that business is doing something. In a global world, in the context of transnational production, large businesses are powerful players.”

Yet these are the same players who have a vested interest in preserving the system which guarantees healthy profits currently at the expense of the planet. Capitalist production requires increasing rates of consumption and reproduction, which for de-growth advocates, means it is on a collision course with the finite capacity of the planet. So how can businesses self-regulate when they have little immediate interest in anything other than profit margins?

But as Schleifer points out, multi-level regulation is already the new reality of climate governance. For him, the emphasis must lie in adapting to this new trend and in promoting democratic legitimacy in a milieu where elected bodies are no longer the only ones producing regulation. “More and more regulation is supplied by the private sector and not by public or states. It would be wrong to oppose the two. They often interact in very complex ways, with
“Policy frameworks are very important in the way they provide incentives for individuals. I don’t think people will wake up one day and say, ‘ok we’ll behave in a carbon neutral fashion and stop driving cars’”

many actors coming together. This is why the question of legitimacy is so important. We need new theories of democratic legitimacy that are fitted to the new realities of climate governance.

But what of the role of consumers, of ordinary citizens far removed from this parallel world of international treaties? Is consumer demand sufficient to encourage companies to invest in eco-friendly alternatives? In the first of the EUI’s series on COP 21, Jean-Michel Glachant suggests that the call for alternatives from consumers is not yet powerful enough. Glachant told EUI Times, “The political resistance is mainly people and not political parties or governments. This is your aunt, your neighbour, the average guy in the street…It’s a failure of policy, but the roots of failure are in the mind-sets of our compatriots.”

Schleifer also doubts whether change can occur without government administered incentives. “Policy frameworks are very important in the way they provide incentives for individuals. I don’t think people will wake up one day and say, ‘ok we’ll behave in a carbon neutral fashion and stop driving cars’”. So I think having the right policies in place is very important, and it’s important to have these policies in place at the international level, but then these also have to be implemented at a domestic level.”

As COP21 in December draws nearer, extracting tangible agreements out of the smoky haze of global power dynamics and international realpolitik forms the challenge to a new era of green governance. As dieselgate testifies, neutral and effective regulation at both private and state levels is essential to this.

Jean-Michel Glachant is Robert Schuman Chair Professor at the EUI’s Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, and Director of the Florence School of Regulation and Director of the Loyola de Palacio Energy Policy Programme.

Philip Schleifer is a Max Weber Post-doctoral Fellow affiliated with the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the EUI. He is a co-author of the 2015 GLOBE International Climate Legislation Study.
Features

From Walter Benjamin to Virginia Woolf, cities have captured the imagination of philosophers, artists and critics grappling with the condition of (post)modernity. Oscillating between depictions of the city as a realm of Dickensian slums, vice and deprivation on the one hand, and a utopian vision of ordered social progress on the other, in recent years the urban space has also loomed large in policy-centred debates about economic growth, devolved governance and transnational capitalism. Urbanisation is presented as an inevitable facet of 21st century life.

But behind these debates is the spectre of gentrification. Synonymous in popular consciousness with bobo coffee bars, artisanal homebrew and vintage shops, the term was coined in 1964 by urban sociologist Ruth Glass to describe the complex processes involved in the displacement of poorer communities by the more affluent. Recent decades have seen a surge in urban anti-gentrification movements, including the vandalism of the ‘cereal café’ in London’s Shoreditch earlier this year.

However for Stéphane Van Damme, Professor in the EUI’s History and Civilisation Department, the city has always been “a very disputed place” and gentrification its underbelly. Ideas of reclaiming urban space in the face of increasing privatisation have been central to the emancipatory political movements which emerged in the late 20th century. It was Henri Lefebvre who famously conceived of ‘the right to the city’ in his 1968 work The Urban Revolution. Urban geographer David Harvey argues that this right to the city is ‘one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights’.

“Sous les pavés, la plage!”
(under the pavement, the beach!)
-Paris, 1968

Stéphane Van Damme
Van Damme traces the gentrifying impulse back to notions of social segregation which emerged through the social and municipal reforms of the 19th century. “You have the development of liberal governance and the idea that urban political elites want to impose a form of social control on the population. The discourse was very clearly about eradicating the slum and the dangerosity of the poor. There was a form of sanitisation of the city. Very strongly evident was the idea to ‘police’. For instance, the big avenues in Paris were linked to vision of controlling protest, and to avoid barricades.”

In the mid-19th century Napoléon III commissioned Haussmann to reconfigure and ultimately transform the urban scale of Paris, creating wide boulevards to recreate Paris as a ‘city of light’. In doing so, Paris’s narrow streets, which had been longstanding cradles of revolutionary ferment, were swept away. Urban planning would emerge, therefore, as a civic process with deeply ideological implications.

Van Damme sees continuities between these 19th century reforming trends and contemporary relations with the city. “If you take what happened in Brixton recently [anti-gentrification protests], this is interesting. In the Brixton protest what is striking is the convergence of all the tensions you find in the metropolis; racial, economic claims and so on. It seems new, it’s very eclectic, but we need to be cautious because it’s not just anti-capitalistic, it is far more complex. It’s a legacy of what happened in the 19th century with the urban trajectory and the multiplication of urban inequalities.”

Yet while the social inequalities plaguing the city may be as old as the proverbial hills, the city as a space conceived apart from the nation is conversely rather new. It sometimes seems as if cities have eclipsed the nation state around them. To speak of Tokyo, London, Paris or New York is to enter into a new vision of a ‘global city’ which is culturally autonomous and possesses a remarkable degree of political independence.

As Van Damme believes that cities are the driving force of economic growth in the 21st century. “More and more cities are disconnected from their national framework. They are the centre of global capitalism. You have, more and more, big cities like London and Paris which are states in themselves in terms of budgets and functionalities.”

However Nicholas Mithen, a PhD researcher of the early modern period in the History and Civilisation department, and organiser of an interdisciplinary working group on cities, is sceptical of the ‘global city’ label and its suitability in capturing people’s lived reality of urban life. “It suggests that there is a process of homogenisation where cities are becoming an international experience. I don’t think that’s convincing. Even though you see the same brands and architecture, it doesn’t define people’s social life. There is somehow the myth of the city… the interesting dynamic is how that ideal affects and defines your material experience within the city.”

Mithen additionally sees European integration as a trend which has contributed to powerful and autonomous cities by decentraling the nation state. He sees the urban space as a lens through which wider political processes and social change are articulated.
Because much power has been transferred to the EU as a supranational body, nation states no longer seem as important as they once were. This in turn has opened up new opportunities for cities to innovate policies and build connections with cities beyond national borders. “I think the EU can provide that ground to empower cities in so far as it gets away from the binary of nation and local government, and rather it presents a multi-layered system which is much more in keeping with how people experience the world,” Mithen tells EUI Times.

Many of these new initiatives concern sustainability and ‘green’ growth which has served to blur the distinction between urban and rural. Many elements of the rural experience have indeed been incorporated within the parameters of the city. As Van Damme points out, “this divide between city and country is no more so active. In fact more and more the utopia is to reinstall nature within the city with city gardens, city farms and so on.” This month it was announced for example, that a new park in Paris has been planned to run along the right bank of the Seine, expanding the number of public green spaces in the French capital.

But ‘greening’ the city is as socially contested as any other aspect of urban planning. Historically the drive for publicly maintained parks has been tightly linked to support for common spaces, as opposed to the private and gated. But in recent years, green initiatives have also contributed to a process of “eco-gentrification”. Van Damme identifies an acute tension between the reintroduction of nature to cities and the potential for existing inequalities to be intensified. “There is a need not to use the environmental cause to expel people outside the metropolis, or to reinvent the ghettoes like in Paris” he warns. New York’s famous high-line presents an indication of this; having opened in 2009, it attracts over five million visitors annually. This has pushed up rents and led to the closure of many small, independent businesses, altering the cultural and economic landscape of the area. Many critics hence point out that introducing green spaces to communities can often entrench patterns of social segregation, rather than subverting them.

It is clear therefore, that the city in the 21st century remains unsettled and deeply contested terrain. Who owns the urban space and who controls it are central questions in today’s policy debates at national and supranational levels. The skylines of cities may have altered over centuries but the concerns of the inhabitants remain familiar.

Nicholas Mithen is a second year researcher in the Department of History and Civilization.

Stéphane Van Damme is Professor of the History of Science in the Department of History and Civilization.
What is the relationship between agency and institutional change? Does the former lead to the latter, when and how? And what impact does this have on inequality?

Probing these questions, alongside many others, is Professor Klarita Gërxhani, who joined the EUI in September. She was previously Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and Co-Director of the programme group Institutions, Inequalities and Life Courses at the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research.

“My research profile is broad. I look at tax evasion and the informal sector, as well as the labour market from the employers point of view in terms of recruitment behaviour. My research is about whether individuals are capable, and under what conditions, of changing a social situation.”

One application of this research is in the area of gender discrimination. In recent years there has been increasing pressure placed upon large companies to enact change from within in line with changing social norms. As Western societies have become increasingly sensitive to a commitment to gender and racial equality, the persistence of a gender pay gap and the disproportionate number of white men in top positions has provoked outcry. But strategies to address these problems are highly contested.

In this case, to explore the effects of strategies used by institutions to respond to these concerns Gërxhani asks “What are the mechanisms of change? What are the possibilities of endogenous change from within?” To analyse these she uses a combination of survey data and experimental data.

Introducing quotas for women to ensure parity at higher level positions is often proposed as a tool to tackle these gender discrepancies. But Gërxhani believes that if quotas are introduced without a strong popular commitment, their implementation could be counter-productive. “Why do some countries have quotas? Is it a bottom-up proposal or is it imposed? I believe that if it is more endogenous it is more sustainable. If you impose it in a country which is more traditional it may do more harm. But don’t get me wrong, I’m in favour of quotas. If that is what it takes, that’s what it takes.”

Her research has all along examined the clash that occurs when social norms and institutional rules are misaligned. Another application concerns tax evasion. She explains, “In former communist countries the institutional rules changed overnight, from state regulated economies to the free-market. However, people’s behaviour was guided for forty-five years by the previous social norms. My research shows evidence that where the norms of the past clashed with the rules of the present, more underground economies were observed. And the same holds in any organisation; if you have social norms that clash with rules, the conflict will lead to unstable and possibly undesirable outcomes.”

Navigating this tricky interaction of change from above and below is at the heart of understanding a Europe defined by a dialectic of tradition and progress.

Klarita Gërxhani is Professor of Sociology in the EUI’s Department of Political and Social Sciences.
The Arab Spring, beginning in 2010 with the Tunisian revolution, was a period of revolutionary transformation for the North Africa region. Its participants rejected the authoritarian rule of the postcolonial era and reclaimed their city streets and squares to demand meaningful political emancipation. Some commentators have hence identified parallels between the decolonisation struggles of the 1960s and the Arab Spring.

But focusing on North Africa in the pre-colonial era, M’Hamed Oualdi, a Fernand Braudel Fellow at the EUI and Assistant Professor at Princeton, believes that recovering pre-colonial histories is as vital as the postcolonial in understanding the history of the Maghreb and its relations with Europe. Oualdi received his PhD from the Sorbonne with a thesis on Beys of Tunis’ mamluks (European slaves converted to Islam) from the 17th to the 19th century. He tells EUI Times, “the main question I am trying to deal with is how we should write the history of North Africa to take into account the pre-colonial period and the Ottoman legacy.”

Colonial history can sometimes inadvertently reinforce the idea that the history of colonised societies begins and ends with colonialism. But as Oualdi asserts, “Bringing back a pre-colonial period is important because it shows that these countries had their own history, their own temporality before the colonial period. It makes the history of the colonial era more complex. It’s not only an encounter between Europeans and Muslims, and in this sense it’s not a sharp battle between them and us.”

Oualdi also believes that understanding the pre-colonial can enrich postcolonial scholarship and impart nuance to understandings of European-North Africa relations over time. It can restore agency to decolonised nations, expanding the parameters of their history beyond the colonial.

This is in part because writing pre-colonial history relies on sources written in local languages which use locally derived concepts, thereby working from the voices of the pre-colonial society. “If you do colonial history you don’t need the Arabic language because the colonial sources are written in colonial languages. It is to bring back the complexity of the story which is not a dialogic of them and us”, Oualdi explains.

“The colonial period is a rupture, it is a traumatic period. It is an important moment of transformation; it is a moment of violence for the colonised people. But that doesn’t hide other histories of this area. These people have their own agenda, their own legacies. When you do colonial history sometimes you focus on the colonisers and the sources you’re using are coming from the colonisers. So how do we understand local histories? I think it is relevant for today because we are still looking at how North African societies are acting.”

For a region that remains the crucible of revolt and regeneration, the eyes of the world remain fixed on the Maghreb. Oualdi’s research reminds us of the complex narratives in its history with Europe and the world.

M’Hamed Oualdi is a Fernand Braudel Fellow in the Department of History and Civilization. He is visiting from Princeton University.
Healthcare has emerged as a political hot-potato for European societies, especially as economic troubles have levied strain on its funding. In the UK, the National Health Service (NHS), which provides free and universal healthcare at the point of access, is considered a veritable institution in itself, inextricably bound up with the post-war humanitarian ideals it arose out of. Ensuring accessible healthcare is considered a cornerstone of European policy. But as healthcare in some European countries is increasingly opened up to a private, competitive model à la United States, how can Europe maintain fair and free healthcare in principle and practice?

Theodosia Stavroulaki is a third year researcher in Law at the European University Institute exploring this labyrinthine issue. Freshly returned from Washington D.C., where she secured a prestigious scholarship from the American Bar Association open to only two non-US competition law specialists, her research deals with "to what extent healthcare quality can be maintained when competition law applies in the healthcare sector. The question is particularly important now because UK and the Netherlands have started adapting competition models, so that competition applies in the healthcare sector," she tells EUI Times.

Her visit to America was particularly useful because US antitrust enforcers have extensive experience in applying anti-trust law in the healthcare sector. Benefiting from entry to American scholarly legal networks ("It’s amazing how approachable scholars are in the US!”), Stavroulaki also had opportunity to interview professionals from the Federal Trade Commission which is the anti-trust authority in the US, as well as presenting her own research project to anti-trust enforcers. Stavroulaki elaborates, “The main difference [between the US and Europe] is that in the US they consider the healthcare sector not as a ‘different’ sector, it is a market like other markets, while in Europe we have a totally different perspective. We think that healthcare is special because the state has to ensure that everybody has access to the system and that specific goals are pursued such as solidarity, universality and efficiency. In Europe the state has specific obligations and the application of competition law must make sure these goals are reached.”

But competition is contentious. Many argue opening up healthcare to the free market makes it less accessible to the poor and precarious, all the while generating profits for providers. It deviates from the principle of universality which underpinned the founding of Europe’s welfare states. If healthcare is a human right, should it be operated as a for-profit business? Stavroulaki is pragmatic in her answer. “Now that we have the privatisation of healthcare, [I am looking at] how the application of competition can be in line with health policy goals. For me the most important issue is not if we have a state system or a private system; I think that whatever the system, all people should have access to healthcare that is affordable and equitable.”

Adament that her future lies in academia, Stavroulaki’s research places her at the heart of debates on healthcare and competition law in the European Union and beyond.

Theodosia Stavroulaki is a third year researcher in the EUI’s Department of Law.
The refugee crisis is a moral crisis for the European Union as well as a humanitarian emergency. There is a sense not only that the decision-making processes are breaking down but that the Union has failed to meet the moral challenge. To this extent it calls to mind the sense of failure experienced at the time of Srebrenica. That experience, twenty years ago, provided an impetus for real progress in developing the Union’s crisis management capacity, but it is not easy to see today’s crisis having a positive catalytic effect. Turning those seeking refuge in the Union into an external security threat has not served to create unity or stimulate solidarity. On the contrary the result has been to encourage a retreat behind national boundaries and the illusion of a safe internal space behind ever higher external walls, as all those deemed outsiders – wherever they are from and wherever they are – become symptomatic of disorder.

The refugee crisis unfolds in the shadow of the acute crisis of the Eurozone which divided the member states and sapped political energy in Europe. The refugee crisis is a fissure in a second core EU regime, Schengen. Again the member states are divided and are engaging in a ritual of blame attribution. The crisis requires a collective European response and burden sharing. Although the Union is ill equipped to deliver this, the costs of failure are very high. Although the Union’s governing capacity is being severely tested, it must find a way of muddling through as it has in the past.

It certainly has the potential to do so, as we see by the fragmentation it produced in public reactions, national self-perceptions, policy responses. It exposes the historical fault line between views of Europe based on separation and homogeneity on the one hand, and on rights and pluralist openness on the other. It projects a schizophrenic image of Europe as upholder and violator of human rights. More crucially, it makes clear that a European order geared to a low-growth regime, with substantial sectors of the population growing poorer and more insecure, will not withstand, much less overcome, the many challenges coming its way.

Marise Cremona  Brigid Laffan  Federico Romero
Europe has welcomed far bigger waves of refugees than the present one (the boat people for instance in the late 1970s). Most of the Syrian refugees are middle class and educated, they will not conflate with the precedent “Muslim” labour migrations of the sixties and seventies, who came on a misunderstanding (to find work, not to integrate): the current refugees are culturally, socially and intellectually very different. They will integrate precisely because they have technical and professional skills and because they chose Europe instead of other countries in the Middle East (contrary to the bulk of less educated refugees who are staying in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan).

The refugee crisis of today is large and dramatic but is not unprecedented (see the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s) and surely Europe can deal with it. The crisis is most likely to have a mild positive economic effect (through increased consumption, plentiful and cheap labour force, increased funding/employment for reception and emergency aid) and a positive demographic effect (refugees are young people). However, these will be largely offset by the costs (for supporting and integrating the newcomers) and job competition (between the newcomers and the disadvantaged natives). All in all the crisis won’t change nor break Europe. The more we manage to govern it, though, the better its outcome will be.
Our car draws up on a deserted street. In front of us, a young man leans idly against a pole and reads a newspaper. He looks up from the newspaper as we approach the driveway and reaches for his phone.

We are part of a United Nations mission investigating the human rights situation in pre-Revolution Tunisia. One of us is the Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, the other is a member of the mission. The building we approach houses the Ligue Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (LTDH), an NGO which will go on to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015.

After two hours, the man would still be there when we left. Again, he would look up from his newspaper, stare in our direction and make another call.

This was one year before the revolution of 2011 swept through Tunisia, and President Ben Ali’s police state was tangible everywhere. The man we saw when arriving was from the secret police, explained lawyer Mokhtar Trifi, the President of the Tunisian human rights organization. Every day there was someone in the street to monitor the comings and goings of visitors. Some visitors were actively threatened and intimidated if they tried to enter; only foreign visitors and members of the League’s board were allowed to enter without obstruction.

The regime did not formally close down the NGO, because that would have drawn direct criticism from the international community. Instead, the Ben Ali regime made the life of the NGO as difficult as possible, starting with the prohibition of transfers of funds from abroad.

The LTDH inhabited a damp and cold office, where the wall paint was peeling and there was barely enough money for paper, let alone employees. The condition of the office, however, did not reflect the mood of the two LTDH leaders who we met there. They remained ebullient and determined despite the fact that the NGO had faced legal proceedings for having signed communiqués denouncing human rights violations, and despite the fact that people rarely dared to communicate with them for fear of reprisals. The policeman outside the door was a constant warning that the state kept a hostile eye on them. In Tunisia, Big Brother wore a baseball cap.

The atmosphere of repression was overwhelming before the Tunisian revolution that came in 2011. People didn’t dare to express their views on the street because they were afraid of who might be listening. People were afraid to communicate with us because the email and telephone traffic was routinely intercepted.

One of our team interviewed a prisoner in the notorious Mornaguia prison near Tunis, who was forced to reveal all his online passwords under torture. The team-member still has a vivid image of the traces of torture that were visible around his wrists and his back.

After receiving his passwords, the security authorities went on to check this person’s private messages on Facebook, which subsequently triggered a new round of arrests of opponents. Privacy and freedom of speech did not exist. As a consequence, self-censorship was rife.

We interviewed a 32-year old man with a 40-year prison sentence. He pulled off his shirt showing the marks of torture: three small burns on the stomach, from electricity cords, larger burns in the back, from cigarettes, and the fingernails of his left hand now growing back having been pulled out. He insisted on speaking to us, despite
of the fact that another inmate was sleeping in the bunk bed, or pretending to sleep. When we asked about this fellow prisoner, he said he had never seen him before as he was brought into the cell just before our interview. Undeterred, the prisoner still wanted to speak to us.

At the end of our UN mission, a press conference was held to report our findings. It was chaired by a Tunisian UN official who made every effort to prioritize the government-friendly journalists of the local mainstream media. As could be expected, the reports in those media made headlines of the Special Rapporteur’s introductory phrases which described the negative impact of counter-terrorism measures as a global phenomenon.

The outspoken critique was expressed in coded language. Reporting that there was “a gap between the legal texts and actual practice” was as far as Tunisian media could go. In a diplomatic cable to Washington, the US Ambassador reported that LTDH President Trifi had expressed concern that the Tunisian government would misrepresent the findings of our mission. The cable, released by Wikileaks, continues: “While the press’s disingenuous spin was typical and predictable, the GOT’s acceptance of Scheinin, and its tangible, if unenthusiastic, cooperation with him, represent a step forward on a long road toward improved human rights practices in Tunisia.”

Five years later, this NGO won the Nobel Peace Prize as part of the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet. That Nobel Prize is not only an inspiration to all Tunisians who want to continue to uphold the democratic values of the 2011 revolution. It is also of course, a reminder that the right to privacy and freedom of expression are not only individual rights but are crucial to safeguarding democracy everywhere. Only when you’ve been in a society where these two rights are utterly absent, you realise their supreme importance.

Martin Scheinin is Professor of International Law and Human Rights at the EUI. He directed the recently concluded Framework Programme 7 project SURVEILLE, Surveillance: Ethical Issues, Legal Limitations, and Efficiency. In 2005-2011 he served as United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism.

Mathias Vermeulen works as a policy advisor for an MEP in the European Parliament and is affiliated with the Research Group on Law, Science, Technology & Society at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. He has worked on various Framework 7 projects relating to surveillance, intelligence agencies and terrorism.
Revolutionary times make revolutionary people, we might assume, and especially in the fraught terrain of the Israel-Palestine conflict. But as Luigi Achilli contends in his recently published book examining political (dis)engagement among Palestinian refugees living in camps such as al-Wihdat in Jordan, actually sometimes the converse is true.

Given the concentration of people and ideas within their confines, refugee camps are often presupposed to be spaces of fierce resistance and deep-rooted nationalist fervour. The first Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan were established at the aftermath of the 1948 Israeli-Arab war by the Red Cross as temporary, emergency shelter for displaced Palestinians. Following the 1967 War, a new wave of refugees arrived and today 42% of registered Palestinian refugees live in Jordan. Palestinian refugees have since been barred from returning to Israel by the Israeli government.

But centring on the years surrounding the Arab Spring, in his book Achilli subverts assumptions that Palestinian refugees are highly politicised subjects by virtue of the upheaval which defines their transitory status. Using an anthropological lens, Achilli’s book forces readers to question what it means to be political and what political expression means in times of tumult.

Deviating from much in the field of resistance studies, he instead outlines how a collective sense of national identity has developed in Jordanian refugee camps distinct from wider political systems, parties and ideologies. Nationalist sentiment has been reconfigured, and is manifest in the desire of Palestinian refugees to integrate into Jordanian society so as to achieve economic security and community stability. Nationalism exists in harmony both outside of the old nation and within a new one; reconciled with notions of integration, it has shifted from the focus on grand armed struggle, to everyday expressions of community identity, such as attending a football match, or praying.

Achilli spent three years living in the camps as he conducted his research. His research is inflected with personal memory and a sense of shared experience. During that time, “my life trajectory and [the refugees’] life trajectories somehow intersect, even though from mine it is from a privileged position”, he tells *EUI Times*.

Gender and masculinity emerge as highly important variables in this portrayal of nationalism. Achilli’s book is primarily based on his interviews and interactions with (self-identifying) men. He argues that the masculine implications of armed resistance are subordinated to a masculinised desire to be the primary economic breadwinner. His book therefore opens up avenues for further enquiry, notably over how expressions of national identity are complicated by gender for example. How do women conceive their national identity or express themselves politically?

Ultimately Achilli’s book is intended to impart nuance to understandings of Palestinian nationalism and expressions of political identity. In the highly contested field of Israel-Palestine relations, Achilli’s work is striking in how it downplays institutional or militant politics, to emphasis Palestinian refugee’s withdrawal from formalised political structures. We are left with the gentler vision of the everyday as the realm where political identity is definitively formed, and performed.
When states dissolve and national borders are re-sketched, what happens to the inhabitants caught within? To those who are in the nation, but not of the nation? This is an over-arching theme in Jelena Džankić’s book *Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro*. Džankić is a Fellow at the EUI’s European University Democracy Observatory (EUDO) project which studies democracy and citizenship in Europe.

At the crux of the book and of explorations on citizenship more generally, is the realisation that it means many things, from rights bestowed by the state such as access to social security to abstract notions of political belonging. Džankić tells *EUI Times*, “I define citizenship as an articulation of the state’s identity. Each state has its own identity and the way it defines citizenship says a lot about how that state is functioning and what that state is. It tells you how the state manages difference and how it deals with minorities”.

In the book Džankić takes the post-Communist Western Balkans as her focus because, having experienced conflict and state transformation so recently, they are especially propitious sites for analyses on citizenship today. “I use these states as a mini-laboratory. You see a huge spectrum of citizenship policies regulating exclusion and inclusion, and symbols of citizenship and how it is experienced”, she explains.

Originally from Montenegro, Džankić has personal experience navigating the region’s vacillating citizenship policies. After the breakup of Yugoslavia she was without Montenegrin citizenship for a number of years despite being born there.

Džankić argues that the nations which were re-made after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe were configured in highly narrow ways. Rather than taking into account the pluralist ethnic make-up of the new countries, the governments’ nation-building projects asserted the primacy of dominant groups. “They had ethnic groups in conflict, and as an outcome you have citizenship policies which are very restricted. In Macedonia you have state symbols which only reflect the dominant ethnic community for example. [Political elites] virtually reconstructed the nation’s capital as part of the nation building project. They say it is rooted in antiquity but it only reflects the dominant ethnic population and the minorities are put aside.”

The implications of Džankić’s book therefore extend beyond the (relatively recently constituted) borders of the Western Balkan states. In a world where the right of belonging to a nation and who is entitled to its protection remain so universally and assiduously policed, *Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro* is a timely reminder of the importance of scholarship on citizenship beyond the European Union borders to today’s global policy debates.

Del Sarto, Raffaella. *Fragmented borders, interdependence and external relations* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015)


Piernas López, Juan Jorge. *The concept of state aid under EU law: from internal market to competition and beyond*. (Oxford University Press, 2015)


The logic, features and future shape of the new financial architecture of the Eurozone were discussed under Chatham House Rules on the occasion of a high-level conference hosted in Florence on 23 April 2015, by the European University Institute in cooperation with Imperial College London. The conference was attended by central bankers, EU policy-makers, members of the financial industry as well as by academics.

The following key conclusions came out from the discussion:

1. Despite its incomplete nature, the Banking Union represents a great achievement in terms of financial stability control, thus ensuring a more resilient euro area.

2. By contrast, the exact objective, scope and institutional capabilities of the Capital Markets Union remain a puzzle to many participants.

3. Risks of regulatory fragmentation arising between the European Union and the Euro Area are somewhat exaggerated, it was overall felt. The existence of European platforms such as the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) acts as a safeguard to the integrity of the single market.

This volume was published by the Florence School of Banking and Finance at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and is available for downloading free of charge in the EUI’s institutional repository (cadmus): http://hdl.handle.net/1814/37478

The Gulf region has become an increasingly important international actor but many questions about the six monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council remain unanswered. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, different domestic and international dynamics are at play and the changes in the geopolitics of the Middle East have transformed the regional policies of the states of the Gulf countries. In order to explore these complex issues, the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute held a conference on ‘The Gulf region: domestic dynamics and global-regional perspectives. Implications for the EU’ (Florence, Italy, 20-21 April 2015). This E-book captures the range and diversity of the vibrant intellectual debate that took place during the conference. Contributors to this volume analyse the changes and challenges affecting the Gulf monarchies: from the sustainability of their economic model to the security threats arising from the crises in Yemen, Iraq and Syria, from demography and immigration policies to the politicization of sectarian identities, from the international opportunities arising from the new role of GCC states to the confrontation with Iran. This volume offers a range of insights into one of the less known partners of the European Union and provides a valuable reference both for academics and policy-makers.

This volume was published by the Mediterranean Programme at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and is available for downloading free of charge in the EUI’s institutional repository (cadmus): http://hdl.handle.net/1814/37734
The EUI is now accepting applications for its fully-funded doctoral programs in the departments of Economics, Law, History and Civilization, and Political and Social Sciences.

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The State of the Union conference, organised by the European University Institute (EUI), is an annual event for high-level reflection on the European Union.

High-profile actors in politics and the law, in finance and economics, and in religious and associational life will be invited to discuss the situation of women in Europe and beyond, in a series of keynotes and round table discussions that bring together the worlds of politics and policy with those of academic research.

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